We study the double exit phenomenon-new IPO 
the connection between the IPO market and M & A market. Instead of being simply pigeonholed into one choice, entrepreneurs can create valuable options for themselves. They probably use IPO as an intermediate strategic step to reach their ultimate goal of being acquired (Note 4).
While no firm will reveal its exact motivation of going public is to be taken over, neither can researchers test the intention empirically because firms either can seek potential bidders or are being sought out, we are not suggesting getting acquired is double exit firms' motivation behind their IPOs.
An important question that follows is why those double exit firms are quickly acquired after becoming public even if being taken over is not the primary motive for an IPO, what intrinsic characteristics of the double exit firms make them an attractive takeover target in the M & A market. A similar research was conducted by Reuer and Shen (2004) . They compare firms with "sequential divestiture through IPOs" with "outright divestiture of private firms", and argue IPO can ameliorate the costs due to information asymmetries in M & A market.
In this paper we propose that IPO, as an information dissemination tool and a signaling tool, can help some firms to increase their visibility, and reinforce their identity. Particularly, when target firms are unable to demonstrate their quality or credibility, going public can mitigate the effect of information asymmetry and enhance the likelihood of being acquired by prospective bidders. Our research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It provides empirical evidence to explain the dual exit phenomenon. In addition, it further supports previous research on how IPO market and M & A market are closely connected. Finally, it complements the entrepreneurial literature that IPO offers a valuable option for insiders to eventually sell out their firms.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews various theories related to IPO and M & A markets, and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describe our data and sample, and explain the construction of empirical proxies used in this research. Section 4 presents our empirical test results. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The theory on double exit strategy is not new. Zingales (1995) proposes a framework that IPO is a mechanism employed by an initial owner to maximize his wealth. The owner sells cash flow rights in a firm in IPO to dispersed shareholders to maximize his sales proceeds. Then he can eventually sell the control rights by directly negotiating with a potential bidder. A particular combination of firm control and dispersed ownership will decide whether the firm should stay private or go public. Consistent with this argument, Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) find high turnover of control in newly public Italian firms, and Rydqvist and Hogholm (1995) analyze Swedish data to show a key motivation of IPOs is to relinquish the control rights.
In Hsieh, Lyanders and Zhdanov's (2008) real option based model, they link firms' going public decision with their subsequent acquisition activities. By going public, managers learn the true value of their own firm. Thus, an IPO allows a firm to exercise its acquisition option to optimize the value of the takeover gain. Celikyurt, Sevilir, Shivdasani (2008) show a higher amount of acquisition activities by newly public firms. While they look at the role of IPO from the acquiring firms' perspective, a complementary view can be taken by examining the role of IPO for target firms. Brau and Fawcett (2006) report survey results from CFOs that the most cited motives for IPO were the creation of publics shares for use in future acquisitions and establishing a market value for the firm. where the dependent variable Double Exit firm takes a value of one if the firm is acquired in year t within the three years following its IPO, and zero otherwise. F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal variable (Note 6). All variables will be discussed below. At any time t, the sample includes all firms that are still public at that point in time, and the firms that get acquired in that year. After a firm gets acquired with three years, that firm is dropped from the sample. For firms that are acquired within three years of IPO, they each will have 4 firm-year observations in our sample.
To test H1, we define Underpricing as the difference between first trading day close price and offer price, scaled by the offer price. As suggested by prior research, information asymmetry is assumed in most explanations for underpricing of IPOs. We expect double exit firms are those with higher degrees of information asymmetry, and IPO is employed as a signal to mitigate the effect of information asymmetry.
Based on H2, the variable Prestigious IB assumes a value of one if the IPO's lead underwriter is a prestigious investment bank with score no less than 7.5, zero otherwise. According to Loughran and Ritter (2004) , the investment bank scores range from 1 to 9, with the higher value indicating a more reputable underwriter. The important certification role for investment banks in the IPO process suggests that double exit firms are more likely to be those underwritten by high-tiered investment banks.
To test H3, VC Backing is a dummy variable, one if the IPO is backed by venture capitalists, zero otherwise. Venture capitals typically reject 98% of the proposals, and their core capability is their skill to identify young firms with novel technologies that have the potential to generate abnormal returns. At an early stage, VCs also take an active role in managing the firm. Thus, we expect double exit firms are more likely to be those backed by venture capitals.
Finally to test H4, Hi-Tech is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm's primary three-digit SIC codes is 357, 367, 369, 382, 384, or 737, zero otherwise. Firms operating in high-tech industries usually spend heavily on research and development to keep pace with modern trends. However, high spending on research and development does not necessarily guarantee "more creativity, higher profit or a greater market share" (Note 7), which provides another ex ante valuation challenge. High-tech IPOs generally receive very favorable perceptions from investors, especially during the internet bubble period (Maksimovic & Pichler, 2001; Brau, Francis, & Kohers, 2003 Liquidity is the ratio between secondary shares in the IPO to total shares. Selling considerable secondary shares or reducing stock ownership usually send negative signals to the investors because by doing so entrepreneurs and other top management in the firm, in turn, reduces their incentives to expend effort to maximize firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1977) .
In addition to the variables discussed above, we also incorporate a number of control variables, at firm level, industry level and macroeconomic level, which have been found significant by prior research in affecting firm's decision to go public.
Size is the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets (Note 8). Firm size usually reflects different degrees of information asymmetry. Large firms generally get more media attention and analysts coverage, so that their value is easier to identify. Besides, IPOs involve explicit high cost (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1993; Pagano & Roell, 1998; Ritter, 2008) , and only big firms can enjoy economy of scale (Jensen & Ljungqvist, 1996) . Then smaller firms or firms with high intangible assets tend to go public to reveal their value, and to signal their quality by enduring the cost, and undergoing the scrutiny of SEC, financial analysts, and a broad base of shareholders. To control for firm's debt level, we compute Debt as the ratio of the firm's long-term debt to total assets. Firms with debt can credibly show that they have already been undergone the close monitoring of lenders. Intangibility is calculated as 1-the ratio of net property, plant and equipments divided by total assets. Intangible assets, such as, copyrights, trademark, goodwill, etc., often cannot be physically measured. Therefore, firms with higher intangible assets face greater valuation uncertainty, thus imposing a greater challenge for corporate raiders. Again we expect
Intangibility to have a positive relationship with the probability of double exit.
To capture the firm's future growth prospects, we use the market value of the firm's common stock versus book value to construct Market-to-Book. CAPEX is the ratio of the firm's capital expenditure scaled by total assets. ROA measures the return on asset, which is the firm's EBITDA divided by total assets. Consistent with previous literature, we also constructed FCF to address a possible acquisition reason-the free cash flow problem. Jensen (1986) noted the agency costs associated with free cash flows, which allowed firms' managers to finance projects with negative NPVs. Following Mehran and
Peristiani (2009), FCF is the net cash flow (after-tax operating income before depreciation) minus cash and preferred dividends and interest payments, normalized by total assets.
Next, we define three proxies to examine the effect of industry environment. HHI is the Herfindahl index, which captures the degree of competition within an industry. This index is constructed by summing up the squared sales of all firms of a particular industry at the 2-digit SIC code. The higher the index, the higher the industry concentration. Literature is mixed on the effect of industry concentration on acquisitions. High industry concentration provides an environment unconducive to firm survival or further consolidation due to antitrust concerns. Thus, IPO would be too costly, and firms would opt for a direct merger in high concentration industries. However, high degree of industry competition also implies a larger set of potential acquirers and reduced information asymmetry. Finally, we present two market-timing variables that have been hypothesized to influence the likelihood of acquisitions. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) claim that merger waves are triggered by stock market overvaluation. On the contrary, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) relate the clustering of merger activities to periods of economic contractions. To control for the time varying effect of the equity market, we use CRSP_VW as the lagged annual return of value weighted CRSP market index return. Two alternative measures are motivated by the observed merger waves over time (Jared, 2004; Duchin & Schmit, 2007) , the number and the total deal value of mergers, in each industry as defined by 2-digit SIC code, over the past 12 months. To capture the intensity of merger activities in the same industry over the past year, Merger Intensity N is the logarithm of (1 plus) the accumulated number of deals in acquirer's industry over the previous 12 months. Merger Intensity AMT is the logarithm of (1 plus) the accumulated value of mergers measured by the deal value in the acquirer's industry over the year prior to the merger (Note 9). To capture the interaction of hi-tech firms and the internet bubble time period, we create a dummy variable equal to one, if it is a high-tech firm that went public in 1999 or 2000, zero otherwise. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the two subsamples of double exit firms and mature public firms respectively. Table 3 further presents the p-value of the two sample t-test for the differences in mean and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the differences in underlying distributions of all variables in interest. All reported statistics are measured one fiscal year before their IPOs.
Results

Univariate Tests
Consistent with hypothesis H1, we see that the double exit firms are more severely underpriced in their IPOs. The average underpricing for double exit firm is 27.3%, while that of mature IPOs is 21.2%.
Hypothesis H2 predicts that double exit firms are more likely backed by venture capitalists. In Table 3 , on average 55.1% of the double exit firms are backed by venture capitalists, 12.3% higher than firms that remain public three years after IPO. Moreover, 77.9% Double exit firms are underwritten by prestigious investment banks, 14.4% higher than rest of the IPO firms, which confirms hypothesis H3.
Finally, 44.3% of the double exit firms are from hi-tech industries, which is about 12.5% higher than mature IPOs. Double exit firms also have a higher proportion of high tech firms that went public during 1999-2000, the internet bubble period (14.5% vs. 7.6%). The acquisition soon after their IPOs appears to ride the merger wave in their industries. In summary, the results of the univariate tests strongly support the predictions of our 4 hypotheses. In the next subsection, we will examine whether these results hold in a multivariate framework. Backing has a positive effect on the likelihood of being acquired. In all specifications, the coefficients of VC Backing are positive and significant at the 1% level. The odds ratio indicates that given everything else equal, with the presence of VC, the probability of getting acquired is about 30% higher.
Consistent with H3, Prestigious IB also has a positive effect on the likelihood of being acquired. In all specifications, the coefficients of Prestigious IB are positive and significant at the 1% level. The chance of being taken over for firms underwritten by a prestigious investment bank stand is 70% higher.
Consistent with H4, Hi Tech has a positive effect on the likelihood of being acquired. In all specifications, the coefficients of Hi Tech are positive and significant at the 1% level. Being a hi-tech firm, its visibility lead to the likelihood of getting acquired 40% higher, vis-à-vis non hi-tech.
In specification 1 and 2, we omit Market-to-book and Rnd respectively due to the presence of Hi Tech dummy because hi-tech firms usually have high growth opportunities and/or intensive input in R & D.
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One firm level control variable, Intangibility, is positive and significant at 10% level across all specifications. This further confirms our previous analysis that firms unable to reveal their quality or credibility, those with high level of intangible assets, those in hi-tech industries, can enhance their visibility through IPO, and subsequently get acquired in the M & A market.
The coefficient on Size suggests that the double exit firms are actually not smaller than mature IPOs, but it is insignificant. Double exit firms have higher Debt level and higher capital spending but neither of the variables is significant. Market to book ratio is insignificant, since it is a proxy for both growth opportunities and asymmetric information, which may be well captured by the Hi Tech dummy. Fcf also has positive coefficient, consistent with previous research results that firms with high level of free cash flow will more likely to be on the radar of corporate raiders. However, it is statistically insignificant.
In summary, the results in Panel A strongly supports our hypotheses that firms backed by venture capitalists, underwritten by prestigious investment banks, and rooted in hi-tech sectors are more likely to become double exit firms. In summary, the empirical evidence from the multivariate probit analysis in Table 4 shows that why double exit firms are so quickly acquired is broadly consistent with the hypotheses in Section 2. We find that the proxies for quality of the IPO firms, measures of asymmetric information, and market conditions have a very significant impact on the probability of double exit.
While we find no evidence of a positive relationship between underpricing and the incidence of double exit firms across all the specifications, we attempt to examine the phenomenon in greater details. We first narrow down the IPO-acquisition window to 1 year, and re-estimate the models. However, there is still no evidence that underpricing plays an important role in increasing the chance of acquisition. 
Discussion and Conclusion
This study examines the double exit phenomenon-new IPO firms get acquired quickly in the M & A market. Previous theory has provided framework that insiders can maximize total proceeds by first selling cash flow rights in IPO and subsequent selling the control rights. It is widely known that private targets receive a significant price discount while public targets are selling at a premium.
In this study, we attempt to discern the distinct characteristics of new public firms that made them acquired soon after their IPOs. Specifically we find that double exit firms are those backed by venture capital. Double exit firms generally have prestigious investment banks underwrite their IPOs. High technology firms are more likely to be taken over soon after their IPOs. Also, double exit firms have higher level of intangible assets.
We suggest that IPO may play an important role in firms' following acquisition incidence. First, IPO helps to reduce ex ante transaction costs between firms and financial markets, such as raising external capitals. In the M & A market particularly, among all public firms, those with severe information asymmetry problems will most benefit from going public. As information asymmetry typically prevails the M & A market, IPO can reduce asymmetric information problem by disclosing accounting information, undergoing SEC scrutiny and analyst coverage. Second, IPOs wink signals concerning the quality of the firm.
Our results supplement a number of previous researches. In Brau and Fawcett (2006) Due to the asymmetric information, signaling theory continues to be an inseparable component of IPOs.
Consistent with previous research (Brau & Fawcett, 2003) , using a top investment banker is the one of the strongest signals sending by the firm. Certification by a prestigious investment bank facilitates the subsequent takeover of double exit firms.
As IPOs are generally treated as an independent decision, our findings of the timing of double exit incidences shed light on the possible connection between the IPO market and the M & A market. IPOs are not the final destination for entrepreneurs, top managers, and venture capitalists.
We are left with the puzzle of why those firms go IPO in the first place. It would also be interesting to see whether the signals sent by IPOs have any impact of the payment methods in M & A. Investment banks play an important role in firms IPO, acting as merger advisors, either for target firms or acquiring firms. Our hope is that this paper will encourage a more thorough and robust line for future research.
